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Commentary
Stephen H. Axilrod 
But such a relatively limited time period does
not quite do full justice to the story. For instance,
the whole history of unsuccessful Fed monetary
policies in the 1970s as the great inflation evolved
and intensified, along with unsuccessful forays by
the Fed and the Treasury into foreign exchange
market intervention as confidence in the dollar
on exchange markets waned, were factors in how
and when the policy shift of 1979 occurred. In
other words, more was involved in “how” than
events during the time line traced by the authors.
In discussing “how,” I would also place very
great stress on the appointment of Volcker as
Chairman. Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche do
not, in my reading, give enough weight to his
unique contribution. Indeed, I believe the events
of October 1979 represent one of the few instances
in monetary history when a significant policy
change—a change that was essentially a paradigm
shift—would not have occurred except for the
presence and influence of one individual. No
doubt, inflation would have been tamed in the
1980s without Volcker as Chairman—the time
was right, history was beckoning. But without
him, it would have been accomplished through
more traditional means, less promptly, and, in
my opinion, with more economic disruption and
social turmoil over time than was experienced
through the short, though relatively deep, reces-
sion that the country did experience. 
Such a dramatic shift as did occur was enabled
because Volcker combined two characteristics
not usually found in a leader. He was, for one
thing, something of an artist in policy in that he
could think and act beyond the normal bounds
of central bank practice of the day. Second, he
L
indsey, Orphanides, and Rasche (2005)
have covered issues involved in the
hows and whys of the Fed’s bold and
effective policy shift of October 1979
comprehensively and very well. In my comments,
I will follow their outline, thus presenting some-
thing like variations on a theme. Perhaps there
will be some counterpoint. No truly discordant
notes seem in the offing.
HOW
It is difficult to separate the hows and whys
of the Fed’s policy shift, as it is with many other
seminal events, and I find the authors’ division
of reasons and events within those two categories,
as well as my own, to be somewhat arbitrary. Their
discussion of “how” encompasses events from
the beginning of 1979 through the spring of 1980.
It involves a time line covering the last part of the
Miller years at the Fed (when Volcker served as
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and thus vice chairman of the Federal Open
Market Committee [FOMC]), to the appointment
of Volcker as Chairman of the Board of Governors
on August 6, 1979 (and thus Chairman of the
FOMC), to market disturbances on September 18
(when a discount rate rise was announced but with
a split vote of four to three), to the famous policy
announcement on October 6, shortly after Volcker
returned a bit early from an annual meeting of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) held in Yugoslavia and just
a few days before the next scheduled meeting of
the FOMC on October 16. 
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interested, in the arcana of monetary operations
that his colleagues on the Board and FOMC could
be quite confident in his ability to understand the
details of the complex technical process under-
lying the new approach. Thus, they could feel
comfortable in his ability readily to oversee oper-
ations and ensure that the staff engineers of the
new machinery were operating it correctly in line
with FOMC wishes. 
It is not easy to find both characteristics in
one person. Moreover, this combination of policy
artistry on a foundation of high technical capacity
gave Volcker himself the confidence, and perhaps
more importantly the aura, to be convincing not
only to his colleagues but also to the public, whom
he also had to win over to the idea that the new
policy would work and that the Fed would indeed
stick to it.
With regard to the specific timing triggers for
the policy change, I am a little surprised by the
emphasis the authors place on the events of
September 18. Perhaps I am surprised because I
have not retained them in mind over the years.
That is not evidence one way or another, of course,
but still it makes me a bit doubtful about the extent
to which they were crucial. On that particular day
the FOMC made a decision to tighten but, in the
usage of the period, did not announce it. On the
same day, the Board also announced a rise in the
discount rate, but three out of seven members
voted against it. (They were presumed to be
doves.) The combined action seemed to have had
a destabilizing effect on markets, since such a
narrow vote on the discount rate was interpreted
to mean that the Fed’s resistance to inflationary
pressures would not be strong enough. 
The authors seem to suggest that if FOMC
decisions had been announced immediately, as
they are now, then the market might not have been
so doubtful about the Fed’s anti-inflationary inten-
tions. I am not so sure of that. An announcement
in the early afternoon of the FOMC decision to
tighten a bit further, coupled with an announce-
ment in the late afternoon of the narrowly voted
discount rate increase, might well have been
equally confusing to the market. For instance, it
might have signaled that the Fed would not be
eager to raise rates even further, especially so
because some who voted against the announced
discount rate increase had also voted for the
unannounced open market tightening. As a result,
markets may have been thrown into no less con-
sternation than they in fact were. 
Basically, announcements or no announce-
ments, the whole history of Fed policy over the
previous decade had led to a severe erosion in the
institution’s anti-inflation credibility in financial
markets as well as in markets for goods and labor.
Adverse expectations were occasioning mini-crisis
after mini-crisis in credit and foreign exchange
markets, whether fully justified or not by the
actual situation at the time they occurred. In my
memory, the problems were most pointed in for-
eign exchange markets. In any event, it was not
so much a particular market event, such as the
sharp rise in commodity prices of September 18,
but more importantly a deteriorating trend in
markets generally that was continuing into late
summer and early fall, especially in the foreign
exchange market, that clearly signaled the need
for a paradigm shift in domestic monetary policy.
Various approaches had been tried in earlier years
to shore up the foreign exchange value of the dol-
lar, including currency interventions of differing
intensities and degrees of international coordina-
tion. None had worked effectively because U.S.
domestic monetary policy had little credibility. 
In that respect, the new approach to policy,
by shifting domestic monetary policy to a more
determined anti-inflation stance, could also be
expected to help stabilize the dollar on exchange
markets, with positive spillover effects that would
help support the Fed’s basic goal of containing
and rolling back the domestic rate of inflation and
inflation expectations. In that context, I am con-
vinced that the major policy shift of October was
well in process and probably would have taken
place in any event before the next scheduled
FOMC meeting on October 16, though I cannot
be absolutely sure on this point. Incidentally, on
this, and on other statements in this paper, I
should certainly not be interpreted as necessarily
reflecting the views of Paul Volcker—or, for that
matter, any other member of the FOMC at the time. 
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limited perspective—which was somewhat like
that of a mouse confined to a treadmill, working
away at keeping the monetary machinery going.
I do recall a brief discussion with Volcker, shortly
after he arrived, to the effect that the staff was
ready to control the money supply more directly
through a reserve targeting procedure if and when
he wished to move in that direction. Much of the
mechanism had been worked out years earlier. As
I remember, a staff subcommittee that I chaired
had recommended to its parent subcommittee
composed of FOMC members—and set up early
in the Burns years to review the structure of the
FOMC policy directive—that M1 be taken as the
intermediate target for policy and nonborrowed
reserves be employed as the day-to-day operating
mechanism for control. The parent subcommittee
did not adopt that recommendation. 
I literally do not remember when Volcker
came back to begin discussing operational issues
more seriously with me. I do remember his telling
me that I could not go to Yugoslavia with the U.S.
delegation since I (along with Peter Sternlight, who
managed open market operations at the New York
Fed) needed to begin the preparation of a formal
document to be sent to the FOMC describing how
the new policy would work in practice. Since I
was not the least bit surprised about the need to
stay behind, I have always assumed that the issue
had already been settled in his mind and that he
felt confident about the outcome of an FOMC vote.
Thus, my memory, such as it is, while not incon-
sistent with at least some emphasis on the events
of September 18, would be quite consistent with
the view that Volcker had made up his mind ear-
lier and that September 18 was not much more
than one more mini-crisis along the way (which
is my own opinion on the matter). 
For some time, Volcker must have been in
the process of checking with FOMC members; I
assume that later, after he was sure of going ahead,
he informed a few key policymakers outside the
Fed whose understanding of the policy and its
implications was important to its successful
public launch. His trip to the IMF/IBRD meeting
in Yugoslavia (where key international finance
ministers and central bankers were assembled)
and early return were quite possibly the final
informational step. It would have been necessary
to act promptly thereafter, and before the next
regularly scheduled FOMC meeting, in part
because of the possibility of undesirable leaks
once a number of people around the world were
knowledgeable about what was in train.
WHY
I think of “why” a little differently from
Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche. Their 12 rea-
sons, for one thing, seem to conflate the immediate
policy problem at the time with issues related to
the long-run stance of policy. Moreover, their list
also includes as separate reasons a number of
factors—for example, more funds rate flexibility,
switching away from efforts to control money
through interest rates and effects on money
demand to more direct money supply control, and
distancing the FOMC from the day-to-day level
of the funds rate—that were essentially intrinsic
to targeting a reserve aggregate, that went along
with making it a desirable solution to the imme-
diate policy problem. In so structuring their list
of reasons, the authors, while in effect more or less
correctly identifying the particular trees in the
forest planted by policy, risk losing sight of what
were the basic reasons for planting this particular
forest in the first place. 
I would emphasize three whys for the partic-
ular decision, made on October 6, to shift from
targeting interest rates to targeting a reserve aggre-
gate in the implementation of monetary policy.
First, the Federal Reserve badly needed to
regain its credibility as an inflation fighter. 
A new policy regime would be a signal step
toward that end; it would reinforce, in the minds
of the public, the Fed’s determination to bring
inflation under control. By emphasizing a new
approach to controlling money, the Fed was send-
ing a message that it would not repeat the mistakes
of the 1970s. In that period, the Fed indicated that
the money supply was a key, if not the principal,
intermediate-term operating target; however,
unfortunately, its actual policy actions came to
lead the market to believe that the institution was
not in practice prepared to do what was necessary
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shifted the base for its money growth targets every
three months or so and thus did not make up for
the all-too-prevalent overshoots in growth relative
to its initial intentions. One of the governors of
the day, Henry Wallich, coined the apt phrase
“base drift” to describe this practice. Anti-inflation
credibility was soon lost, as prices kept rising
and the Fed’s inability or unwillingness to attain
its monetary targets was perceived as a principal
cause.
Second, if credibility was to be regained with
minimum disruption, markets had to be convinced
within a reasonably short period that the new
approach would be effective. 
By effective, I mean that it would in practice
lead to more certain control of the money supply
and, thus, of inflation. It was expected that shifting
to a control mechanism that was based on the
multiplier relationship between the supply of
reserves and the supply of money would have a
better chance of yielding closer control of the
money supply than would continuing with a
control mechanism based on estimating the
demand for money given the various explanatory
variables that could be considered (and indeed
were by a large number of econometricians both
inside and outside the Fed), such as interest rates,
income, and the various lagged relationships
involved. 
Third, it would be advantageous if the natural
and virtually unavoidable caution with which
policymakers approach their meeting-by-meeting
policy decisions became less of an impediment
to effective anti-inflationary action. 
This was accomplished by making aggregate
reserves (and thus, in effect, the money supply
directly) the day-to-day instrument for policy
instead of the federal funds rate, since FOMC
members would be voting on, and presumably
sticking to, an operational monetary supply target
and would no longer be voting on week-to-week
decisions about the federal funds rate (within a
broad range). Policymakers are normally not given
to bold frequent changes in their chosen opera-
tional instrument. When the federal funds rate was
the instrument prior to late 1979, it was moved
with due caution, generally in quarter- or half-
point increments—an experience repeated after
1982, when the funds rate or, for a while, its very
close relative, banks’ adjustment borrowing at the
discount window, once again became the policy
instrument. 
But with the money supply in effect both the
policy target and instrument (converted for oper-
ating purposes into related reserve aggregates and
for day-to-day technical reserve supplying deci-
sions into nonborrowed reserves), policymakers
could retain their conservatism toward the basic
policy instrument. They could maintain their
initial money supply target and derived aggregate
reserve instrument, with appropriate technical
adjustments, meeting after meeting while distanc-
ing themselves, as Lindsey, Orphanides, and
Rasche put it, from the behavior of the funds rate.
Bold market action would ensue, as the funds rate
would be permitted, and expected, to vary within
a wide range in the process of achieving the given
money supply objective. 
Much, if not all, of the three points above
are subsumed in the authors’ first eight reasons.
I will glide over reasons nine and ten. It is their
reasons eleven and twelve that give me the most
pause, though the problem might be largely
semantic. Point eleven states that a further reason
for the policy shift was to demonstrate that the
Fed had more clearly assumed “full central bank
responsibility for the attainment of long-term
price stability,” while point twelve goes on to
give as another reason for the policy change that
it more clearly avoids “difficult questions of overt
responsibility for intermediate-term real-side
developments.” 
I would not think about the 1979 policy shift
in those terms. The central bank is always respon-
sible for price stability and also simply cannot
avoid some responsibility for intermediate-term
real economic developments. I would interpret
the new procedure as a practical approach for
implementing the Fed’s responsibility for price
stability in the situation of the time—following a
period when it had become clear that the Fed had
failed in carrying out that responsibility. Whether
the approach of the 1979 program would be suit-
able permanently would depend on many factors,
not least of which being the further evolution of
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role, stability, and predictability of “money” and
“money-like” assets in relation to prices and the
economy generally. 
The new procedures were designed to reestab-
lish the Fed’s anti-inflation credibility. That was
their essential purpose. In the process, the real
side of the economy was subordinated for a while,
but I never detected any basic lessening of concern
for the real economy on the part of policymakers.
As it turned out, in face of a short but deep reces-
sion, together with surprisingly rapid progress
in reducing inflation, the new procedures were
abandoned in 1982.
Communication Issues
The most important area of communication
for making the new procedures as effective as
possible was between the Fed and the market.
After a hiccup or two at the start, that communi-
cation path worked well. It worked in large part
because Volcker went around the country saying
in one forum after another that the Fed would
stick to it and because the Fed did indeed do so
(and, by the way, in the face of some formidable
obstacles, such as the Carter-inspired credit con-
trol program of the time). The point was to con-
vince not only financial market participants but
also business and labor that inflation would cer-
tainly come under control. If expectations could
be turned around quickly, and cost and price pres-
sures muted, the pain inflicted on the economy
as reasonable overall price stability was restored
would obviously be lessened. In that regard, I
should note the importance of President Reagan’s
handling of the air controllers’ strike of the period.
His firmness helped convince labor and business
as a whole that the economic atmosphere had
changed and that restraint on wage increases, and
presumably therefore on price increases, was the
better part of valor. 
CHARACTERIZING VOLCKER
I am not at all sure that the Lindsey,
Orphanides, and Rasche paper needed to get
into the questions they raise about whether Paul
Volcker was a monetarist, a nominal income tar-
geter, a Keynesian of one sort or another, an infla-
tion targeter, or a great communicator. Nor do I see
much value to the questions for drawing lessons
for the present day with its very different financial,
economic, and social circumstances. 
In any event, I do not believe any of the econ-
omic policy slots they suggest contain the man. I
would say, rather, that he was an eminently practi-
cal person, who very well understood how impor-
tant it was for the health of the economy and the
country to bring inflation down and to restore the
Fed’s anti-inflation credibility. Moreover, he also
had enough political astuteness to grasp that
political and social conditions in the country at
the time presented him with a window of oppor-
tunity for implementing a paradigm shift in policy
that might well make the process of controlling
inflation more convincing and quicker. In his
choice of policy instrument, he was a practical
monetarist for a three-year period. 
On the question of whether Volcker was or
was not a great communicator, they conclude that
he was not. I do not agree. They seem to base their
conclusion in large part on Volcker’s response to
Mervyn King when the latter asked if he had some
word of advice for a new central banker. Volcker,
so King reports, responded with one word—
“mystique.” Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche
conclude that is not the advice of a great communi-
cator; they take this view mainly, it seems, because
that advice was given by a man who also presided
over a central bank that had been less transparent
in announcing policy decisions (the FOMC did
not in those days announce its decisions imme-
diately) than major central banks are today. 
Surely, our authors are at risk of making
something akin to a category error. The mystique
of a central banker would seem to me to have little
to do with whether or not policy decisions are
transparent (that is, announced when made).
Mystique is more the product of the success of
the policies actually pursued and the extent to
which the public associates that success with
the person in charge of policy. In that sense,
Greenspan today has a kind of mystique. And in
that very same sense, Volcker in his day had a
kind of mystique. 
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The advantage of mystique to a policy chief
is that public confidence in the policy he repre-
sents will be high and his word (i.e., his commu-
nications with the market, the public generally,
and the Congress) will be more readily believed
and accepted—with a practical effect, for instance,
that market expectations more likely will reinforce
rather than work against policy. That mystique,
and its benefits for communication, can readily
be lost, or at least eroded, when policies seem to
go wrong (whether transparent in announcement
or not), as, for example, appears to have been expe-
rienced by Greenspan, at least for a while, follow-
ing the stock market crash at the beginning of
this millennium. 
In short, “mystique” is what helps turn a Fed
Chairman into a great communicator, although
“great” might be a bit too grand an adjective when
referring to the rather mundane occupation of
central banking. At any rate, to me mystique is a
trait that enhances a Chairman’s stature and con-
fidence in the institution he heads, thus aiding the
implementation and communication of policies
irrespective of the process by which the institu-
tion itself decides to announce policies.
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